More mystique than results: The legacy of Russia’s Wagner Group

Wagner Group was one of the more mysterious and convoluted elements of the Russian military. The group existed long before the Ukrainian war, but was always shadowed in secrecy that wasn’t well penetrated.

Wagner Group, or PMC Wagner, was a Russian private military corporation led by Yevgeny Prigozhin until his suspicious death in 2023 two month after his attempted coup against Russian President Putin. PMCs are illegal in Russia, but Wagner wasn’t. The reason it was allowed to operate was that it worked for the Russian government, as a separate military force, offering the Kremlin plausible deniability.

Russia could thus project hard military power around the world without deploying regular troops. Wagner deployed to Africa, Syria, Ukraine, and beyond, and Moscow could claim they were a private group.

This allowed the group to conduct violent operations that could result in high casualties on both sides and leave the Russian government free of both international and domestic scrutiny. For example, when the Wagner group participated in an attack on American forces in Syria and was summarily wiped out, it wasn’t considered an act of war against the United States since it wasn’t the Russian military that had participated.

Wagner would often provide security to dictators in Africa and training to their troops in exchange for lucrative resource-extraction contracts.

Who joined Wagner

Wagner mercenaries. (Creative Commons)

At the height of its power in 2023, Wagner could field an estimated 85,000 troops, according to some. The men who make up Wagner’s forces come from three different sources.

The original source of Wagner troops were veterans of the Russian military, ranging from general forces to Spetsnaz and GRU operators. In Wagner, their job was similar to their former one, but with less oversight and without the rigid structure of military forces. And possibly, since Wagner was a private company, they likely had less bureaucracy to deal with, which is appealing in its own right.

After taking heavy casualties in Ukraine, Wagner’s recruiting opened up. The first source of new recruits came from Russian prisons. Penal recruits came in by the thousands as a promise of freedom and a wiped criminal record if they survived six months was enough to get plenty of volunteers.

Wagner also actively recruited foreign nationals, something a company can do more easily than a military force. They promised high salaries under the guise of security work in the foreign national’s home country. However, many – if not the majority – of foreign nationals were directed to the front lines of Ukraine instead.

By Russian standards, Wagner troops were well compensated and for most of its existence, they were paid better than standard Russian troops. They received cash bonuses for combat operations, and when killed, death benefits were paid to their family.

Since being rolled into the regular military, Wagner troops’ pay was standardized to align with regular military deployment pay scales.

The group’s combat record and ultimate fate

Wagner mercenaries somewhere in Ukraine. (Anton Gerashchenko on X)

The original Wagner Group recruited from the Russian military, had a degree of training and experience. As the organization expanded operations, it gained combat experience from operations in Syria, Libya, and sub-Saharan Africa.

Nevertheless, judging from the engagements that came to light, Wagner troops couldn’t go toe to toe with most Western forces, as demonstrated in the annihilation of Wagner mercenaries in Syria by U.S. special operations units.

With the recruitment of prisoners and foreign nationals, training was seemingly reduced to a few weeks before the new recruits were fed into the meat grinder. As a whole, the final incarnation of the Wagner Group would not be considered an elite force.

By American standards, we likely wouldn’t judge them as effective. The United States aims to mitigate casualties while achieving objectives. Wagner did not have the same mindset – and neither does Russia as a whole.

Related: Ukraine’s air force will get a big boost thanks to Sweden and a powerful European missile

Nevertheless, Wagner troops showed effectiveness in specific operations: They secured key oil fields and fought insurgent forces in Syria buttressing the Assad regime. In Ukraine, they were the primary assault force against the heavily fortified cities of Soledar and Bakhmut. To do so, they took heavy casualties and fought a battle of attrition.

As the group’s more experienced troops were killed or captured, and penal recruits and foreign nationals entered the fray, the group’s effectiveness waned in Ukraine.

Ultimately, Wagner’s reputation was shaped by allegations of brutality and war crimes more than its battlefield performance.

The distinction between Wagner and the Russian military, as well as the original Wagner PMC structure, have ceased to exist.

After Wagner Group’s attempted coup against the Russian government was stopped, the organization was folded into the Russian Ministry of Defence, completely eliminating the veil of separation between state and corporation.

The remnants of Wagner have been absorbed into organizations and command elements – like Africa Corps and Redut PMC – controlled by the Russian Ministry of Defence, and any autonomy or financial independence they had had is gone.

Feature Image: Wagner Group mercenaries. (Creative Commons)

Read more from Sandboxx News

SOCOM wants to double the range of its M4 rifles, but that won’t be easy

Attack on FOB 4: The worst day in U.S. Army Special Forces history

Army still questing for a lighter shoulder-launched munition for urban combat

SIG Sauer wins the rifle contract for Romania’s military

Air Force has just awarded the first CCA contracts ahead of schedule